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ON COMPETITION FOR SPATIALLY DISTRIBUTED
RESOURCES ON NETWORKS
GIORGIO FABBRI∗, SILVIA FAGGIAN†, AND GIUSEPPE FRENI‡
Abstract. We study the dynamics of the exploitation of a natural resource,
distributed in space and mobile, where spatial diversification is introduced by a
network structure. Players are assigned to different nodes by a regulator, after
he/she decides at which nodes natural reserves are established. The game solution
shows how the dynamics of spatial distribution depends on the productivity of the
various sites, on the structure of the connections between the various locations,
and on the preferences of the agents. At the same time, the best locations to
host a nature reserve are identified in terms of the parameters of the model,
and it turns out they correspond to the most central (in the sense of eigenvector
centrality) nodes of a suitably redefined network which takes into account the
nodes productivities.
Keywords: Harvesting, spatial models, differential games, nature reserve.
JEL Classification: Q20, Q28, R11, C73
1. Introduction
In settings where a network of stocks migration flows connects the various sites
where a resource resides, how does the access to the resource of a number of compet-
ing agents should be regulated? And in particular, where natural reserves should be
placed? To provide a first exploration of this issue, in this paper we develop a simple
model where the n ≥ 2 nodes of a weighted directed network represent the n regions
in which a geographical area is partitioned, and the weights upon the edges give the
interregional migration flows of the resource stocks. The n regions are heterogeneous
not only because they are differently connected, but also because the rate of growth
of the resource is not uniform across them. The regulator’s task is the assignment
of extraction rights to f < n agents in order to maximize a welfare function that is
given by the sum of the agents utilities. For reasons we do not indagate - perhaps
there are strong congestion externalities, the regulator is also constrained to assign
no more than one agent to each region. Following the assignment stage, the f agents
compete for the exploitation of the resource as in the classical Levhari and Mirman
(1980) dynamic game, with the two differences that the stock of the resources is not
homogeneous but distributed among the n regions, and that each agent can only
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access the resource through the single node he/she is assigned to. The main aim of
this paper is to study how the structure of the network affects the regulator’s choice.
A small literature has explored aspects of the problem of dynamic strategic inter-
action with distributed and moving resources, especially in order to evaluate whether
management of the resources through a system of Territorial Use Rights (TURF for
fisheries) can effectively mitigate the “tragedy of the commons” (see e.g., Kaffine
and Costello, 2011, Costello et al., 2015, Herrera et al., 2016, Costello and Kaffine,
2018, Costello et al., 2019, de Frutos and Martin-Herran, 2019, Fabbri et al., 2020).
For example, Kaffine and Costello (2011) have shown, using a discrete time model,
that Territorial Use Rights coupled with profits sharing can effectively reduce over-
exploitation of moving resources. Costello et al. (2015) have extended the same
model to show how partial enclosure of the commons can improve the welfare of the
common property regime. Costello and Kaffine (2018) compared the relative effi-
ciency of centralized versus decentralized management of a moving resource when
users have heterogeneous preferences for conservation and the regulator has incom-
plete information about these preferences. On the other hand, in a two region model
in continuous time, Fabbri et al. (2020) have suggested that modulating the access
to the different sites through the assignment of Territorial Use Rights can be effec-
tive in rising the rate of growth of moving collapsing resources, in a context of high
harvesting effort. None of these works, however, have given explicit attention to the
network structures that characterize both the access to the sites and the migration
flows.
In the network literature, there are works that study the role of networks in the
management of natural resources. Currarini et al. (2016) survey various contribu-
tions in which network economics has been used in analyzing issues ranging from
the pattern and speed of diffusion of new green technology, to the structure and
dynamics of international agreements, from the formation of links in building an
environmental coalition, to the role of infrastructural networks in the access to nat-
ural resources. Among these contributions, I˙lkılıc¸ (2011) is closest to the question
we explore here. He studies a static game in which a given number of users ex-
ploit multiple sources of a common pool, and each user faces marginal costs that
are increasing in the total extraction from the site, due to the presence of source
specific congestion externalities. The main conclusion is that in the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game the rate of extraction at each source is proportional to a
centrality measure of the links of the source. More recently, Kyriakopoulou and
Xepapadeas (2018) studied the interaction between a global congestion externality
and local positive externalities, reflecting collaboration links in the exploitation of
a single resource by a given number of agents. They show that the equilibrium rate
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of extraction of agents is, in this case, proportional to their centrality in the local
interactions network.
The aim of this paper is to take further the analysis of the exploitation by a
given number of agents of a moving spatially distributed resource, highlighting that
the equilibrium extraction intensities depend on both the network structure of the
migration flows and the access network. In the model we have n ≥ 2 regions
with general (and not necessarily symmetric) linear migration flows. We find a
Markovian equilibrium in which each agent’s welfare is decreasing in a suitable
centrality measure of his/her assigned node. At the same time we show that, in order
to maximize the sum of agents’ welfares, the social planner has to set natural reserves
in the most “central” regions of an appropriately modified migration network.
Since we focus on migration flows from heterogeneous sources, our centrality
measure is not the Katz-Bonacich index used in I˙lkılıc¸ (2011) or Kyriakopoulou
and Xepapadeas (2018) to study complementarities, but depends both on the (net)
growth rates of the resource at the different nodes and on how much the nodes
broadcast to the other nodes. If all nodes are equally productive (i.e., the net
growth rates are equal), then our measure coincides with the outdegree eigenvector
centrality of the migration network. In the general case, instead, it is the eigenvector
centrality of a derived network, obtained by magnifying outgoing links of each node
by a factor, increasing with the net productivity at the node. Moreover such factor
is less than one for nodes with negative net productivity, equal to one for nodes
with zero net productivity, and greater that one otherwise. In the case of an equally
weighted and complete network, in which the network is neutral, our centrality
measure ranks nodes in increasing order of productivity. The higher the rate of
growth (either net or gross) the higher the rank.
For our model, the highest eigenvalue of the derived network coincides with the
von Neumann rate of growth of the system and plays the same role as the produc-
tivity parameter α in the homogeneous resource dynamic game analyzed in Tornell
and Lane (1999). As in the case examined by Tornell and Lane (1999), we also find
that the agents react voraciously to a positive shock that increases the dominant
eigenvalue when their elasticity of intertemporal substitution is sufficiently higher
than 1 (higher that ff−1 when there are f agents). In turn, this disproportional
increase of the extraction rate results in a fall of the long run rate of growth of
the stocks. Since changing the weigh on a link from one region to another simul-
taneously implies a change in the net rate of growth of the broadcasting node, the
highest eigenvalue depends in a complex way from the weights of the migration net-
work. However, for symmetric networks we are able to establish that the highest
eigenvalue is a decreasing function of the elements of the adjacency matrix. Thus it
turns out that, when voracity prevails in these family of networks, removing part of
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the spatial externalities generated by migration actually reduces the rate of growth
of the resource.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is described and pre-
liminaries are discussed. Sections 3 contains the main results of the paper and the
description of the Nash equilibrium. In Section 4 the role of the network structure is
discussed with the aid of a variety of examples. Section 5 contains the final remarks.
The proofs of all analytic results are collected in Appendix A.
2. The model
We consider a geographical area, partitioned in subareas/regions/locations, and a
standing natural renewable resource, for example fish, mobile through the different
regions.
We represent space through a weighted directed network G with n nodes – as
many as the number of regions, in which the area is partitioned. We denote with
N := {1, .., n} the set of nodes, and with gij ≥ 0 the weight upon the edge connecting
a source node i and a target node j, gij representing the intensity of the outflow from
i to j, so that when gij = 0 and gji = 0, then there are not direct paths between the
two nodes. We assume G strongly connected, that is, there exists a path connecting
any two nodes with corresponding strictly positive coefficients gij . We also assume
that G has no loops, so that gii = 0 for all i ∈ N . We denote with G the (weighted)
n × n adjacency matrix with elements gij , i, j ∈ N , with ei the i-th vector of the
canonical basis on Rn, and with 〈·, ·〉 the inner product in Rn. We also denote by
R+ the set of nonnegative real values.
For all i ∈ N , the quantity Xi(t) stands for the biomass at location i at time t,
and X(t) for the vector with components X1(t), .., Xn(t). The evolution in time of
biomass Xi(t) on region i depends on several factors:
(a) the natural growth ΓiXi(t) of the resource at time t at node i, embodied by
the (constant) natural growth rate Γi;
(b) the outflow of the resource from region i to a linked region j at time t, given
by gijXi(t), so that the net inflow at location i is given by n∑
j=1
gjiXj(t)
−
 n∑
j=1
gijXi(t)
 = 〈Gei, X(t)〉 −
 n∑
j=1
gij
Xi(t)
(c) the rate of extraction ci(t) at time t from region i.
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As a whole, we then have for all i
X˙i(t) =
(
Γi −
n∑
j=1
gij
)
Xi(t) + 〈Gei, X(t)〉 − ci(t).
If A = (aij) is the diagonal matrix of the net reproduction factors, namely{
aij = 0 if i 6= j
aii ≡ ai = Γi −
(∑j=n
j=1 gij
)
,
c(t) is the vector with components c1(t), .., cn(t), and x is the vector of all initial
stocks of the resource at the different nodes, then the evolution of the system in
vector form is
(1)
{
X˙(t) = (A+G>)X(t)− c(t), t > 0
X(0) = x0,
where x0 ∈ Rn+ is the vector of initial biomass concentrations in the various regions.
In addition to that, we require the following positivity constraints
(2) ci(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, i ∈ N
as well as
(3) Xi(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, i ∈ N
Remark 2.1. As a particular case of the described setting we have the situation
where the diffusion process follows Fick’s first law, that is, the flow of the resource
from region i to a linked region j at time t is proportional to the difference Xi(t)−
Xj(t). In this case the matrix G is symmetric as, for connected locations i and j,
we have gij = gji. As a consequence, A+G
> = A+G and the problem simplifies.
Remark 2.2. Note that the matrix A + G> is a Metzler matrix, i.e. it has all
non-negative elements, except at most those on the principal diagonal. Moreover,
since the non-diagonal elements of A+G> are the same as those of G>, which is the
adjacency matrix of a strongly connected network, the graph associated to A + G>
is also strongly connected, implying that A + G> is irreducible (see Theorem 2.1
page 36 in Latora et al., 2017). Consequently, the Perron-Frobenius theorem (see
e.g. Theorem 1.4.4 page 17 of Bapat and Raghavan, 1997) implies that the greatest
eigenvalue of A + G> is simple and that the associated normalized eigenvector is
positive. The same statement holds for the transpose matrix A+G.
Now we assume that some of the regions are exclusively devoted to reproduction
of the resource (natural reserves) while, at the same time, each of the remaining
is assigned to an agent for exclusive exploitation, enhancing a TURF policy. More
precisely, harvesting is prohibited in a subset M of N, while each of the remaining
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regions F := N \M is exclusively assigned to an agent. We set f := |F |, with |F |
denoting the cardinality of the set F , so that n− f = |M |.
Finally, we assume that agents strategically interact in a differential game where
Player i maximizes the payoff
(4) Ji(ci) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
(ci(t))
1−σ
1− σ dt, i ∈ F
for σ > 0 and σ 6= 1.
We denote the trajectory of (1) at time t, starting at x0 and driven by c(t) with
X(t; c(·), x0). We use for strategy profiles the notation c = (ci, c−i), meaning that
Player i chooses ci and the other players choose the vector c−i ∈ Rn−1+ (including
the zero components associated to the nature reserve). Admissible strategy profiles,
at an initial state x0 ∈ Rn+, are those measurable functions c : [0,+∞) → Rn+ that
generate trajectories X(t; c(·), x0) which are contained in Rn+ at all times. Markovian
strategy profiles are a subset of these strategies which are functions only of the
current levels of stock variables. The formal definition follows.1
Definition 2.3. (Markovian Admissible strategy profiles) Consider a given
initial state x0 ∈ Rn+. We say that the vector of continuous functions ψ :=
(ψ1, ..., ψn) : Rn+ → Rn+ is an admissible (stationary) Markovian strategy profile
at x0 if:
(i) for all i ∈M , ψi ≡ 0;
(ii) the equation (1) with ci(t) replaced by ψi(X(t)), i.e.
(5)
{
X˙(t) = (A+G>)X(t)− ψ(X(t)), t > 0
X(0) = x0, .
has a unique solution Xψ(·);
(iii) Xψi (t) ≥ 0, for all t ≥ 0 and for all i ∈ N .
We denote byM(x0) the set of all admissible Markov strategy profiles for the problem
at x0.
Definition 2.4. (Markovian Nash equilibrium) Consider a given initial state
x0 ∈ Rn+, and let ψ ∈ M(x0). We say that ψ is a (stationary) Markovian Nash
equilibrium at x0 if the following fact is true: for all i ∈ F , the control ci(t) =
ψi(X(t)) is optimal for the problem of Player i given by: the state equation (1) where
1Note indeed that some constraint on the state space is needed in order to have existence of
meaningful equilibria, otherwise players would choose to extract infinite amounts of resource, even
from a negative stock.
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the other players choose c−i(t) = ψ−i(X(t)); the constraints (2); the functional Ji(ci)
given by (4), to be maximized over the set of admissible controls
Cψ−i(x0) = {ci : [0,+∞)→ R+ : Xj(t; (ci, ψ−i(X));x0) ≥ 0,∀j ∈ N, ∀t ≥ 0} .
In formulas
Ji(ψi(X)) ≥ Ji(ci), ∀ci ∈ Cψ−i(x).
3. Existence of Markovian Equilibria
This section contains the main results of the paper, describing a class of Markovian
Nash equilibria for the given problem. We advise the reader that all the proofs of
the results stated below are contained in Appendix A. Further notation is now
introduced. We denote by λ the real positive eigenvalue of (A+G) having greatest
real part (see Remark 2.2), and by {λ2, .., λn} the remaining ones, ordered with
decreasing real parts
λ > <(λ2) ≥ <(λ3) ≥ ... ≥ <(λn).
We denote by η = (η1, η2, .., ηn)
> the positive normalized eigenvector associated to
λ. We also define as ξ the vector with components ξi = η
−1
i if i ∈ F , and ξi = 0
otherwise, and ξ η> the n× n matrix obtained by multiplying the column vector ξ
by the row vector η>, in symbols
(6) ξ =
∑
i∈F
η−1i ei, ξ η
> = (ξiηj)ij .
Finally we set
(7) θ :=
ρ+ (σ − 1)λ
1 + (σ − 1)f .
Remark 3.1. Observe that, when f = n (no nature reserves), ξ η> has n−1 eigen-
vectors associated to the eigenvalue 0, all orthogonal to η (and hence generating
〈η〉⊥), and the eigenvector ξ (described in (6)) associated to the eigenvalue λ. Sym-
metrically, η ξ> has eigenvector η associated to the eigenvalue λ, while all remaining
eigenvectors generate 〈ξ〉⊥.
Remark 3.2. The expansion in rows of the equality (A+G)η = λη gives
(8) (λ− ai)ηi =
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
gijηj > 0,
since at least one of the gij is strictly positive (as the network is strongly connected),
which implies in particular
(9) ai < λ, ∀i ∈ F.
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Theorem 3.3. Assume θ > 0, x0 ∈ Rn+ and define ψ : Rn+ → Rn+ as
(10) ψi(x) =
θ
ηi
〈x, η〉 , for all i ∈ F , ψi(x) = 0, for all i 6∈ F .
Assume also that ψ ∈M(x0). Then:
(i) ψ is a Markovian equilibrium of the game in the sense of Definition 2.4;
(ii) the welfare of agent i along such equilibrium is
Vi(x) =
θ−σησ−1i
1− σ 〈x, η〉
1−σ ;
(iii) the corresponding evolution of the system is
(11)
{
X˙(t) = (A+G> − θ ξη>)X(t), t > 0
X(0) = x0.
moreover the trajectory at equilibrium, X∗, satisfies
(12) 〈X∗(t), η〉 = egt〈x0, η〉
with
(13) g = λ− θf = λ− fρ
1 + (σ − 1) f .
Remark 3.4. One can study a version of the model with logarithmic utility. In this
case the evolution of the system is again described by system (1) but the i-th agent
maximizes the functional
Ji(ci) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt ln (c(t)) dt.
In this case a similar result to that described in Theorem 3.3 can be proven. The
value of θ simplifies to ρ, the equilibrium is characterized by the following strategies
ψi(x) =
ρ
ηi
〈x, η〉 , for all i ∈ F , ψi(x) = 0, for all i 6∈ F ,
and the welfare of agent i along the equilibrium is
Vi(x) =
1
ρ
(
ln (〈x, η〉) + ln
(
ρ
ηi
)
+ λ− fρ
)
.
The growth rate is λ− fρ.
Remark 3.5. Note that the positivity of η implies
min
i
ηi
∑
i
X∗i (t) ≤ 〈X∗(t), η〉 ≤ max
i
ηi
∑
i
X∗i (t),
so that (iii) in Theorem 3.3 gives
1
maxi ηi
egt〈x0, η〉 ≤
∑
i
X∗i (t) ≤
1
mini ηi
egt〈x0, η〉.
and g is also the growth rate in the long run of the aggregate stock
∑
iXi(t).
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Proposition 3.6. Assume θ > 0 and that X∗ is the equilibrium trajectory described
in Theorem 3.3. Suppose that G is symmetric, i.e. gij = gji, and regard the growth
rate g as a function of gij (i, j ∈ N , i 6= j). Then:
(i) (standard case) if 1− (1− σ)f > 0, then g is a decreasing function of gij
(i) (voracity effect) if 1− (1− σ)f < 0, then g is an increasing function of gij.
Remark 3.7. We here gain some insight at the condition θ > 0, used in Theorem
3.3. We preliminarily observe that a positive sign of the numerator ρ+ (σ − 1)λ >
0 implies the boundedness of the functional in the case of a single player (f =
1), as well as the boundedness of the functional of a control problem for a social
planner maximizing the sum of utilities of the players, as it can be easily proven.
Moreover, since λ represents the (asymptotic) growth rate of the resource under
null extraction, the result is consistent with the parallel condition ρ+ (σ − 1)A > 0
in the standard single-player/social-planner AK-models (for extraction or growth).
The interpretation of such condition remains the same for a general number f of
players, when both the numerator and the denominator in (7) are positive.
When instead the denominator 1 + (σ − 1)f is negative, and then necessarily the
numerator ρ + (σ − 1)λ is also negative, the outcome for the game and the social
planner problem diverge, in that a Nash equilibrium exists for the game (in presence
of the so- called voracity effect, see Tornell and Lane, 1999) while it can be proven
that a solution for the social planner problem does not exist. This follows from the
greater consumption of the resource (and therefore from the sub-optimality of the
behavior) that one has in the game compared to the planner case: while with this
choice of parameters the functionals of the players remain bounded at the equilibrium,
infinite-utility controls are possible for the planner.
In addition, note that when the denominator is negative (in particular σ ∈ (0, 1))
and the numerator is positive - hence when θ < 0, the reverse situation takes place.
Namely, there exists an optimal control for the planner problem but not our equi-
librium in the game, as the growth rate perceived by players (i.e. λ − (f − 1)θ) is
“too negative” and it would push them to consume the whole resource at time 0, a
strategy which is nonadmissible in our setting.
To better understand this fact, note that in our Markovian equilibrium the ratio
between the i-th agent’s extraction intensity and the capital value, normalized with
the i-th component of the eigenvector put equal to 1, is uniform across agents (the
common value is θ). So one may think that to find the equilibrium one must cross
the “reaction functions”
θi =
ρ− (1− σ)(λ−∑j 6=i θj)
σ
,
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Figure 1. Existence and non-existence of the equilibrium vary-
ing the number of players. The common value of the equilib-
rium extraction intensity of the stock ratio solves the linear system:
θi =
ρ−(1−σ)λ
σ + (f − 1)1−σσ θj , θi = θj . In the case ρ− (1− σ)λ > 0
and σ ∈ (0, 1), the line θi = ρ−(1−σ)λσ + 1−σσ (f − 1)θj intersects the
bisector of the first orthant if and only if 1−σσ (f − 1) < 1 holds.
with symmetry implying
∑
j 6=i θj = (f − 1)θj = (f − 1)θi. As shown in Figure 1, if
ρ− (1− σ)λ > 0, and σ < 1, then there is the solution for the single agent case, but
for an increasing number of agents f and as soon as 1−σσ (f − 1) > 1, the extraction
intensity becomes infinite.
Similar conditions for the aggregate cases with A = 0 are given in Dockner et al.
(2000).
3.1. Stability. In order to address convergence of transitional dynamics towards a
potential steady state, it is useful to describe the equilibrium trajectory in terms
of the eigenvectors/eigenvalues of the matrix of the system in (11), namely A +
G> − θ ξη>. Firstly, we observe that η is a left eigenvector of A+G> and of ξη>,
with associated eigenvalues λ and f respectively, so η is also a left eigenvalue for
A+G>−θ ξη>, associated to the eigenvalue g = λ−θf . Then there exists a (right)
eigenvector ζ of A+G> − θ ξη> associated to the same eigenvalue g.
Remark 3.8. If in addition G = G>, the remaining eigenvectors of A+G−θ ξη> are
the set {w2, .., wn} of eigenvectors of A+G, respectively associated to the eigenvalues
{λ2, .., λn} (now all real). This can be checked by direct proof, making use of Remark
3.1 and of the fact that the vector subspace generated by {w2, .., wn} coincides with
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〈η〉⊥. In other words, in the symmetric case, the dynamic of the system A + G −
θ ξη> with (respectively, without) extraction of the resource, namely the case θ > 0
(respectively, θ = 0), leaves unchanged all eigenvectors and relative eigenvalues
except one, that is associated to the dominant root. That eigenvalue changes from
λ to λ− θf , while the associated eigenvector changes from η to ζ. That means that
the trajectory X∗ is modified only along the direction of such eigenvector.
This argument implies in particular the next proposition.
Proposition 3.9. Assume θ > 0 and the equilibrium trajectory X∗ described in
Theorem 3.3. Assume in addition G = G>. Then there exist real constants ki,
i = 1, ..n, such that
X∗(t) = 〈x0, ζ〉 egtζ +
n∑
i=2
〈x0, wi〉 eλitwi.
Moreover, 0 < θ < λ−λ2f (that is, g > λ2) implies that the detrended trajectory
X∗(t)e−gt satisfies
lim
t→+∞X
∗(t)e−gt = k1ζ,
that is, it converges asymptotically towards the direction of ζ.
In the general case, i.e. when G is not necessarily symmetric, a similar statement
is true. We complete {ζ} into a basis of generalized eigenvectors {ζ ≡ v1, v2, .., vn}
of A + G> − θ ξη>. If {g ≡ µ1, µ2, .., µn} are the associated eigenvalues, with Re
denoting their real part, then the following results holds.
Proposition 3.10. Assume θ > 0 and the equilibrium trajectory X∗ de-
scribed in Theorem 3.3. Then there exist continuous coefficients mi, such that
limt→∞mi(t)e−εt = 0 for all ε > 0, and such that
(14) X∗(t) = m1(t)egtζ +
n∑
i=2
eRe(µi)tmi(t)vi.
Moreover, if 0 < θ < λ−Re(µ2)f (i.e. g > Re(µ2)) then
(15) lim
t→+∞X
∗(t)e−gt = 〈x0, ζ〉 ζ.
3.2. Admissibility. In the first part of this section, starting with Theorem 3.3, we
have always assumed that the strategy profile ψ was in M(x0), that is, admissible
at x0 ∈ Rn+. Here we want to investigate under which conditions that is true. Some
factors are implicated in admissibility of the equilibrium strategy profile ψ:
(a) the magnitude of θ and the positivity of the eigenvector ζ. This is easily under-
stood from the analysis of the symmetric case. As a consequence of Perron-Frobenius
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theorem, all eigenvectors wi for i ≥ 2 have at least one negative coordinate. If θ
is too big, i.e. θ > (λ− λ2)/f (equivalently g < λ2 ), Proposition 3.9 implies that
the detrended trajectory X∗(t)e−λ2t converges along the direction of the second
eigenvector w2 and leaves definitively the positive orthant, when starting at any
initial position x (except for the particular case in which x belongs to the halfline
s = {tζ : t ≥ 0}). On the other hand, when θ < λ−λ2f the detrended trajectory
X∗(t)e−gt converges along the direction of ζ, so that ζ needs to be a positive vector
in order for the trajectory to remain in the positive orthant. Since g and ζ are
continuous functions of θ, and for θ = 0 their values are respectively λ and η which
are both positive, one may argue that there exists θ∗ > 0 such that for all θ such
that 0 < θ < θ∗ one has g(θ) > λ2 and ζ(θ) is a positive vector.
(b) the choice of the initial condition. One simple necessary and sufficient condi-
tion of admissibility of ψ at all initial conditions x0 ∈ Rn+ is the following.
Proposition 3.11. The strategy profile ψ described in Theorem 3.3 is admissible,
namely ψ ∈M(x0) , at every x0 ∈ Rn+ if and only if the following condition is true
(16) 0 ≤ θ ≤ min
i∈F,j∈N
(
gij
ηi
ηj
)
.
The condition is meaningful when all nodes are connected to one another, but
when at least one of the coefficients gij , i ∈ F, j ∈ N is null (i.e. there exist two
locations which are not directly connected), it implies θ = 0, while for θ > 0 there
are always initial positions in the positive orthant at which the equilibrium strategy
is not admissible.
This is the case of the following example. Consider a network for n = 4 where
node i is only connected to nodes i− 1 and i+ 1 and with weight α, and all natural
growth rates are equal to Γ, players are 4 and there is no reserve.
G =

0 α 0 α
α 0 α 0
0 α 0 α
α 0 α 0
 , A = (Γ− 2α)I, E =

1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
 ,
Then (see also Remark 3.8) λ = Γ, λ2 = Γ − 2α, λ3 = Γ − 4α, g = Γ − 4θ,
η = ζ = 12(1, 1, 1, 1), θ = (ρ+ (σ − 1)Γ)/(4σ − 3). Assume in addition that ρ and
σ are such that θ > 0, and θ < α/2 (one such choice is, for instance, σ = 7/8,
and Γ/8 < ρ < Γ/8 + α/4). Then ζ is positive and g > λ2, and the detrended
equilibrium trajectory tends to the direction of ζ, in view of Proposition 3.9. Now
consider the initial condition x0 = (0, 0, 1, 0)
> and the associated trajectory X∗.
Then (X∗1 )′(0) = −θ < 0 and the trajectory leaves immediately the positive orthant.
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Given all previous remarks, we are now ready to deliver a sufficient conditions of
admissibility of the equilibrium strategy ψ for a wide class of networks.
Proposition 3.12. Assume θ > 0 and suppose that the eigenvalue g of A+G−θ ξη>
satisfies g > Re(µ2), and is associated to a positive eigenvector ζ. Then there exists
a linear cone C containing ζ, such that the Markovian equilibrium ψ described in
Theorem 3.3 is admissible at all initial conditions x ∈ C.
Remark 3.13. In Proposition 3.12 we prove the existence of a subset - a cone - of
initial states for which the strategy profile ψ of Theorem 3.3 is admissible, and for
which ψ is in fact an equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.4. The reader might
be led to think that this means that the described equilibrium is somehow, see e.g.
Dockner and Wagener (2014), a local equilibrium, and that the state space needs to
be restricted to that cone. This is not the case: in our results players maximize their
payoff over all admissible strategies, whether they drive the trajectory in or outside
the cone. When in addition conditions of Proposition 3.12 are verified, the chosen
profile of strategies always maintains the trajectory inside the cone.
4. The role of network structure
We intend now to interpret the equilibrium strategy in terms of the network
structure. From Theorem 3.3 we derive the following property.
Corollary 4.1. In the hypotheses and with the notation of Theorem 3.3, the overall
welfare of players
∑
i∈F Vi(x) is maximized if the nature reserves are built at the
locations i where ηi are highest.
The eigenvector η has a straightforward interpretation in network theory. In view
of Remark 2.2, if one considers the modified network G∗ associated with the matrix
G + A, then η represents the so called eigenvector centrality of the network G∗.
Then Corollary 4.1 establishes that nature reserve maximize social welfare when set
at nodes with maximal eigencentrality.
Assume that the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue for G is λ◦ and that η◦ is the nor-
malized eigenvector associated to it, i.e. Gη◦ = λ◦η◦. To better understand how G
and G∗ are related, one may note that equation (A+G)η = λη can be rewritten as
(17) (I − λ−1A)−1Gη = λη,
so that the matrix G is magnified by the diagonal matrix (I − λ−1A)−1 with all
positive elements, as
〈ei, (I − λ−1A)−1ei〉 = λ
λ− ai > 0, ∀i ∈ N.
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as a consequence of (9). Nonetheless, not necessarily are the components ηi of η
influenced by the initial network eigencentrality η◦ and the natural growth rates
Γi in a monotonic way, as better explained through the analysis of the following
subcases and examples:
(a) For networks with equal net reproduction rates, η coincides with the the eigen-
vector centrality of G. Now assume that all net reproduction rates are equal, namely
ai = Γi −
n∑
j=1
gij ≡ a, for all i ∈ N.
Then A+G = aI +G, eigenvectors of G and aI +G are the same, implying η = η◦,
and η, η◦ are associated, respectively, to eigenvalues λ, λ◦ = λ − a. Components
ηi are higher when nodes are better connected to the other nodes and are lower for
peripheral nodes. Corollary 4.1 then implies that welfare is higher when reserves
are set in more central nodes. An example fitting the description is represented in
Figure 2.
Figure 2. A network with equal net reproduction rates, exemplify-
ing those described in Section 4 (a). Here there are 4 nodes and 2
players, so that the planner has to establish a 2-nodes reserve. The
values of the the natural growth rates Γi, together with the com-
ponents of the eigenvalue centrality of the networks G (η◦,i) and G∗
(ηi), are reported in each node. Weights are reported over of the
edges. The dashed line encloses the two nodes in which it is optimal
to establish the reserve.
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(b) In a equally weighted complete network, ηi are ordered like reproduction rates
Γi. Assume now a complete network, with gij = α for some α > 0 and all i 6= j,
and gii = 0.
Combining the i-th and the `-th row of equation (8), one obtains
η` =
ai − λ− α
a` − λ− αηi,
so that from a` − λ− α < 0 (see (9)) one derives
η` ≥ ηi ⇔ a` ≥ ai ⇔ Γ` ≥ Γi.
Then the overall productivity is highest when reserves are placed in locations with
highest reproduction rates. An example fitting the description is represented in
Figure 3.
Figure 3. An equally weighted complete network, exemplifying
those described in Section 4 (b). Here there are 5 nodes and 3 play-
ers, and the planner has to establish a 2-nodes reserve. The values
of the the natural growth rates Γi, together with the components
of the eigenvalue centrality of the networks G (η◦,i) and G∗ (ηi), are
reported in each node. Weights are reported over of the edges. The
dashed line encloses the two nodes in which it is optimal to establish
the reserve.
(c) From the analysis of the previous subcases one may wonder if there exists a
monotonic relationship between Γi, η
◦
i and ηi. For example, if node i has a greater
centrality and reproduction rate than another node j, namely η◦i ≥ η◦i and Γi ≥ Γj ,
then the reserve is better placed at node i than at node j, namely ηi ≥ ηj . The
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answer is negative, as explained in the following example. Consider
G =
0 1 00 0 1
2 0 0
 , Γ1 = 1, Γ2 = 1 + b, Γ3 = 0,
with b > 0. By explicit calculation one has λ◦ = 3
√
2 and η◦ = µ◦/|µ◦| with
µ◦ = (2−2/3, 2−1/3, 1)>. Note that η◦2 > η◦1 and Γ2 > Γ1, that is, node 2 precedes
node 1 both in productivity (natural and net) and centrality. Nonetheless, η1 > η2
for some choices of a positive b, as we show next. To this extent, if η = µ/|µ| , with
µ = (1, µ2, µ3)
>, then µ satisfies
(18)
0 1 00 b 1
2 0 −2

 1µ2
µ3
 = λ
 1µ2
µ3
 ,
whose expansion implies
µ1 = 1, µ2 = λ, µ3 = λ(λ− b), b = λ− 2
λ(λ+ 2)
.
Note that the last equation implies in particular that b is an increasing function of λ
and viceversa. A direct calculation shows that for b = 0 one has λ(0) ' 0.8, so that
by continuity λ(0) < λ(b) < 1 for a small positive b. Hence η1 > η2 and a reserve
is better set in node 1 rather than in node 2. The example is represented in Figure
4(C).
(d) The analysis of the previous example with Γ1 = Γ2 = 1 and Γ3 = 2 + a
helps confirming the interpretation of eigencentrality ηi as a measure of productivity
and connectiveness not only of the i-th node, but also of the nodes more directly
connected to it. In this case
µ1 = 1, µ2 = λ, µ3 = λ
2, a = λ− 2
λ2
,
with λ is an increasing function of a, moreover for a = −1 one has µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = 1,
and λ = 1, so that λ > 1 if and only if a > −1. Therefore
µ1 < µ2 < µ3, for a > −1, and µ1 > µ2 > µ3, for a < −1.
Hence, an increasing reproduction rate Γ3 not only does increase η3 making (defini-
tively) Node-3 the most central, but also influences the centrality η2 of Node-2,
which is more directly connected to it than Node-1. The example is represented in
Figure 4(D).
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(c) The network associated to ex-
ample (c).
(d) The network associated to
example (d).
Figure 4. Representation of examples (c) and (d) of Section 4. In
each case we have 3 nodes and 2 players (so the planner has to
establish a 1-node reserve). The values of the the natural growth
rates Γi, together with the components of the eigenvalue centrality of
the networks G (η◦,i) and G∗ (ηi), are reported in each node. Weights
are reported over of the edges. The dashed line encloses the node in
which it is optimal to establish the reserve.
5. Concluding remarks
The main aim of this paper has been to explore, in a simple framework with
heterogeneous regions and a given number of agents, how the structure of the mi-
gration network affects competition for spatially distributed moving resources. We
have found that if the regulator’s objective is the maximization of the unweighted
sum of the utilities of the agents, and he/she is constrained to assign no more than
one agent to each region, then the reserves should be localized in the most central
regions. Here the relevant centrality measure is given by the eigenvector centrality
of a derived network obtained by magnifying the links of each node in the original
migration network by a factor that is increasing in the productivity of the node
itself.
Although in our analysis both the agents and the regulator care only about con-
sumption of the resource, our model provides a basis for more general analysis
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where preferences for conservation are considered, introducing for example the re-
source stocks in the utility functions of the agents and/or in the regulator welfare
function. A theme of this analysis will be how the role of the regulator is enhanced
under the new hypotheses.
In a different vein, the role of the regulator could be also examined in more general
contexts in which a “bad” extreme equilibrium coexists with the interior equilibrium.
For example, an extreme equilibrium can be expected to exist in variants of our
model if the extracted resource can be stored (e.g., Kremer and Morcom, 2000).
In this case, a spatially structured policy could be a useful tool to eliminate the
incentives that potentially could lead the agents to coordinate on the “bad” outcome.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We initially take the standpont of player i, active at node i.
For all other players we assume that they play a Markovian strategy, described by
cj(t) = aj 〈X(t), η〉 , with j ∈ F − {i},
where aj are nonnegative real numbers. Then the current value Hamiltonian of i
th
player is
(19) h(x, ci, p) :=
1
1− σc
1−σ
i + 〈x, (A+G)p〉 − 〈x, η〉
∑
j∈F−{i}
pjaj − cipi
so that the maximal Hamiltonian is
(20) H(x, p) = max
ci
{
c1−σi
1− σ − cipi
}
+ 〈x, (A+G)p〉 − 〈x, η〉
∑
j∈F−{i}
pjaj
=
σ
1− σp
1− 1
σ
i + 〈x, (A+G)p〉 − 〈x, η〉
∑
j∈F−{i}
pjaj .
with maximum attained at ci = p
− 1
σ
i . As a consequence, the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (briefly, HJB) equation associated to the problem is
ρv(x) =
σ
1− σ
(
∂v
∂xi
)1− 1
σ
+ 〈x, (A+G)∇v(x)〉 − 〈x, η〉
∑
j∈F−{i}
(
∂v
∂xj
)
aj
Step 1: we search for a solution of HJB equation of type
(21) v(x) =
bi
1− σ 〈x, η〉
1−σ , with ∇v(x) = bi 〈x, η〉−σ η
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where bi is a suitable positive real number. Substituting v and its partial derivatives
into the HJB equation, we obtain that v is a solution if and only if
bi =
1
ηi
(
σηi
ρ− λ (1− σ) + (1− σ)∑j∈F−{i} ηjaj
)σ
.
Step 2: Markovian equilibrium. For (20), the candidate optimal strategy for player
i satisfies
(22) ci(t) = (biηi)
− 1
σ 〈X(t), η〉
At equilibrium one has ai = (biηi)
− 1
σ , implying
(23) ai =
1
ηi
ρ− λ (1− σ)
1− (1− σ) f =
θ
ηi
, and bi = η
σ−1
i θ
−σ
from which the formulas (10) and (ii) derive.
Step 3: Closed loop equation. Note that, along the equilibrium trajectories,
c(t) = θ〈X(t), η〉ξ = θ ξη>X(t),
so that the evolution system in (iii) follows. The second part of statement (iii)
follows from
〈X˙(t), η〉 = 〈X(t), (A+G)η〉 − 〈X(t), η〉〈ξ, η〉 = 〈X(t), η〉(λ− θf)
where λ− θf = g = (λ− fρ)(1 + (σ − 1) f)−1.
Step 4: Best response. We verify now that the feedback strategy (10) is the best
response for Player i, when the other players choose ψj , with j 6= i, as in (10). Then
the problem of Player i is maximizing (4) under the dynamics
(24)
{
X˙(t) = (A+G> − θ ξiη>)X(t)− ci(t)ei, t > 0
X(0) = x0.
where the vector ξi coincides with ξ except for the i-th component, which is set
equal to 0, namely ξi` = ξ` for all ` 6= i, and ξii = 0.
Set c∗i (t) = ψ(X
∗(t)) and let ci(t) be any other admissible control, with X∗(t)
and X(t), respectively, the associated trajectories. Now we consider the quantity
(c∗i (t) − ci(t)) ∂v∂xi (X∗(t)) and use the fact that c∗i (t) realizes the maximum in (20)
with aj = θ/ηj , and p = ∇v(X∗(t)) to derive
(25)
1
1− σ
(
c∗i (t)
1−σ − ci(t)1−σ
) ≥ (c∗i (t)− ci(t)) ∂v∂xi (X∗(t))
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Next, observe that, adding and subtracting
〈
(A + G> − θ ξiη>)(X∗(t) −
X(t)),∇v(X∗(t))〉 and making use of (24), the right and side in (25) equals
(26)〈
(A+G> − θ ξiη>)(X∗(t)−X(t)),∇v(X∗(t))〉− 〈(X˙∗(t)− X˙(t)),∇v(X∗(t))〉
=
〈
X∗(t)−X(t), (A+G− θη(ξi)>)∇v(X∗(t))〉− 〈(X˙∗(t)− X˙(t)),∇v(X∗(t))〉.
Recalling (21) and (12) we have
∇v(X∗(t)) = bi〈X∗(t), η〉−ση = bie−σgt〈x0, η〉−ση.
Using this expression and the fact that (A + G − θη(ξi)>)η = (λ − θ(f − 1))η, the
expression in (26) can be written as
= bi〈x0, η〉−σe−σgt
[〈
X∗(t)−X(t), [λ− θ(f − 1)]η〉− 〈(X˙∗(t)− X˙(t)), η〉]
Thus, using these estimates, integrating (25) on [0, T ] for T > 0, we obtain
(27)
∫ T
0
e−ρt
1− σ
(
c∗i (t)
1−σ − ci(t)1−σ
)
dt ≥
bi〈x0, η〉−σ
[ ∫ T
0
e−(σg+ρ)t
〈
X∗(t)−X(t), (λ−θ(f−1))η〉dt−∫ T
0
e−(σg+ρ)t
〈
(X˙∗(t)−X˙(t)), η〉dt]
and, integrating by parts the last term, the right hand side equals
(28) = bi〈x0, η〉−σ
[ ∫ T
0
e−(σg+ρ)t
〈
X∗(t)−X(t), (λ− θ(f − 1))η〉dt+
− e−(ρ+σg)T 〈(X∗(T )−X(T )), η〉 −
∫ T
0
e−(σg+ρ)t
〈
(X∗(t)−X(t)), (σg + ρ)η〉dt]
= bi〈x0, η〉−σe−(ρ+σg)T 〈(X(T )−X∗(T )), η〉 ≥ −bi〈x0, η〉−σe−(ρ+σg)T 〈X∗(T ), η〉
where the last equality is a consequence of σg + ρ = λ − θ(f − 1), and the last
inequality a consequence of 〈X(T ), η〉 ≥ 0, as X(T ) is admissible and hence nonneg-
ative. Now e−(ρ+σg)T 〈X∗(T ), η〉 = e−(ρ+σg)T egT 〈x0, η〉 decreases to 0, as T tends to
+∞, as
(29) g(1− σ)− ρ = −θ < 0.
Thus, taking the limit as T tends to +∞ of the inequalities (27)(28), implies∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
c∗i (t)
1−σ
1− σ dt ≥
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
ci(t)
1−σ
1− σ dt,
that is, the optimality of c∗i (t). (Note that limits exist as integrals are monotonic in
T ).

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Proof of Proposition 3.6. We first check the effect of an -increase of gij , with i 6= j,
on the value of λ. To this extent, fix  > 0 and define Mij := (ei e
>
j + ej e
>
i ) −
(ei e
>
i +ej e
>
j ), and note that the system matrix changes from A+G to A+G+Mij .
Note that this last matrix can be written as the sum of two Metzler matrices
A+G+ Mij = [A− (ei e>i + ej e>j )] + [G+ (ei e>j + ej e>i )]
so that it is itself a Metzler matrix. On the other hand, Mij is a negative-semidefinite
matrix so that 〈x,Mijx〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ Rn. We can argue as in Remark 2.2 and
denote by η its Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of norm 1, and by λ the associated
Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue. Since the network matrix is symmetric, we can use
the variational characterization of eigenvalues (see for instance Corollary III.1.2 of
Bhatia, 2013) so that
(30) max
x∈Rn\{0}
〈x, (A+G+ Mij)x〉
|x|2 = λ =
〈η, (A+G+ Mij)η〉
|η|2
=
〈η, (A+G)η〉
|η|2 + 
〈η,Mijη〉
|η|2
≤ max
x∈Rn\{0}
〈x, (A+G)x〉
|x|2 + 
〈η,Mijη〉
|η|2 ≤ maxx∈Rn\{0}
〈x, (A+G)x〉
|x|2 = λ
This means that dλdgi,j ≤ 0. Using this fact and the expression of the growth rate
given in (13) we get the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 3.10 . If J is the real Jordan form of the matrix A+G>− θE,
then there exists a real invertible matrix P such that P−1(A + G> − θE)P = J .
Consequently there exist real coefficients βi such that
(31) X∗(t) = et(A+G
>−θE)x = PetJ
(
n∑
i=1
〈x0, vi〉P−1vi
)
= P
n∑
i=1
βie
JtP−1vi.
It follows then from the general theory (see for instance Section 1.3 of Colonius and
Kliemann (2014)) that eJtP−1vi = eRe(λi)tMi(t)P−1vi where Mi(t) is a block matrix
(which is non-zero only on the Jordan block related to µi) whose coefficients are
products of sinus and cosinus functions of t and of polynomials of t with maximum
degree the dimensions of the generalized eigenspace. Since PeJtP−1vi is again an
element of the generalized eigenspace associated to µi, it can be written as a linear
combination of the eigenvectors related to the same generalized eigenspace, with
coefficient having the same described behavior for t, and then the first claim follows.
The second statement is a consequence of the same construction, once we observe
that Mi(t) for simple eigenvalue is just a real coefficient. 
Proof of Proposition 3.11 . The conditions (16) is equivalent to requiring that the
matrix of system (11) (having nondiagonal terms gij − θηiξj) is a Metzler matrix,
ON COMPETITION FOR SPATIALLY DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES ON NETWORKS 23
which is equivalent to establishing that the system is positive, that is, it has solutions
contained in the positive orthant Rn+ for all initial conditions x ∈ Rn+ (see for example
Farina and Rinaldi, 2000, Chapter 2). 
Proof of Proposition 3.12. The generalized eigenvector decomposition described in
(14) shows that a trajectory ofX∗ starting at ζ always remains on the linear subspace
generated by ζ. From the same decomposition and from (15) we see that the the
origin is asymptotically stable and then (Theorem 1.4.8 page 16 of Colonius and
Kliemann (2014)) exponentially stable for the system satisfied by
Z(t) = e−gtX∗(t)− 〈x0, ζ〉 ζ.
This assures the existence of a positive open linear cone of initial data containing ζ
for which trajectories always remain positive. 
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